« Management Too Unethical to be a Profession? | Main | Kelly on BonJourian vs. Modest Foundationalism »

May 27, 2004



Hi Joe--

Thanks for the comments. I've tried, perhaps somewhat Quixotically, to defend the claim that knowledge requires stability--though considerations such as the ones you raise seem to require some fancy footwork. I've sketched, all too vaguely, how this might go (http://rationalhunter.typepad.com/close_range/). I suspect that if Schaffer's right about knowledge-wh, then something along the lines I've suggested is defensible.


Thanks for the response, Marc. I've put an initial reaction to your response in a comment on your blog.

Matt Weiner

On the minor point: I thought that instability in justification or belief means that at t1, t3, etc., Kurt is justified and believes; but those conditions are unstable because he's close to not believing or not being justified. Is that the kind of answer you're looking for?


Thanks, Matt. Yes, having seen Marc's response to me, I agree with you that that's what he means with "instability". I was prevented from seeing this reading due to the fact that it seemed (and still seems) obvious to me that being close to not believing or not being justified is not an obstacle to knowing.

The comments to this entry are closed.

March 2013

Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
          1 2
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Blog powered by Typepad
AddThis Social Bookmark Button